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Abstract 
We use a time series approach and industry data to estimate the effect on consumption of an 
excise tax on soft drinks imposed recently in Mexico. The tax caused a price increase of 12.8% and 
reduced per-capita consumption about 3.8%. This effect is small in comparison to the effects 
suggested by most studies that have estimated price elasticities using an almost-ideal-demand-
system and household survey data. 
 
1. Introduction 
Unlike most staple food, soft drinks in Mexico are subject to a 16% Value Added 
Tax (VAT).
1
 In addition to the VAT, consumers pay an excise tax of $1 peso per liter on 
sugary drinks since the beginning of year 2014. This tax came into effect at the beginning 
of year 2014 as part of the tax reform proposed by President Peña. Among many other 
things, the reform included taxes on certain high-calorie foods and sugary drinks. These 
taxes were justified as a measure to reduce overweight and obesity rather than collecting 
tax revenue.
2
 
Before the introduction of the excise tax, the average price of a liter of soft drink in 
Mexico was $7.8 pesos.
3
 Therefore, the tax represented 12.8% of the price. As expected, 
the tax was passed on to consumers. It is relatively easy to establish that this price change 
was caused by the tax because the average price of soft drinks in real terms remained 
practically unchanged for several years until the tax was introduced. Moreover, there was a 
one-to-one transmission of the tax to consumers. Indeed, if we compare the soft drinks 
                                                          
1
 Taxing food and medicine has been a taboo in Mexico. The current VAT on these products is zero. At the 
beginning of his term, President Fox proposed a (positive) VAT on food and medicine. However, his proposal 
was not approved by congress (Tello and Hernandez, 2010).  
2
 Cash and Lacanilao (2007) say that this type of intervention –called fat tax– is one of the most common 
approaches used recently by policy makers to fight obesity. 
3
 This figure is calculated with industry soft drink sales and sales volume gathered by INEGI. We took the 
average implicit price of a liter of soft drinks in the last three months of the year and added the VAT.  
2 
 
price index of the last month of 2013 with the first month of 2014, then we can find that the 
price of soft drinks increased exactly 12.8%.
4
  
It is interesting to look at the effects of the tax on soft drinks in Mexico for several 
reasons. First, there are proposals to levy large taxes on soft drinks in other countries, 
including the US. Therefore, the Mexican experience provides some insight into what could 
happen if these countries approve them. Second, although the US has a large experience 
with soft drink taxes, most of them have been relatively small in comparison to the 
Mexican tax.
5
 Third, there are few countries in the world in which consumption of soft 
drinks is as high as it is in the US. Mexico is one of these countries. During the year before 
the tax came into effect, daily per-capita consumption of soft drinks in Mexico was about 
0.44 liters (or 14.8 ounces). Fourth, unlike state soft drink taxes in the US, the Mexican tax 
was introduced at the same time in the whole nation. Therefore, cross-border shopping is 
not an issue here.
6
 
In this article, we use industry sales time series data to estimate the effect of a one-
peso tax on per-capita consumption of soft drinks in Mexico. According to our estimates, 
the tax reduced per-capita consumption about 3.8%. This figure represents about 0.0167 
liters or 7 calories per day. Interestingly, this reduction in consumption is fairly small in 
comparison to what previous studies suggest. 
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature briefly. Section 3 explains the data and the econometric model that are used to 
estimate the effect of the tax. Section 4 discusses estimation results. Section 5 presents the 
main conclusions.     
2. Brief review of the literature 
The effectiveness of the tax on soft drinks to reduce obesity depends on a series of 
events that have been widely discussed –mostly separately– in the economic literature. In 
particular, the tax can be effective if: (a) it causes a relatively large increase in the price of 
soft drinks (that is, a large part of the tax is passed on to consumers); (b) consumption of 
soft drinks is sensitive to its price (in other words, the price elasticity of demand for soft 
drinks is large); (c) a lower consumption of soft drinks actually reduces individuals’ caloric 
intake (that is, soft drinks calories are not substituted with other calories); and (d) a lower 
caloric intake reduces overweight and obesity (this requires soft drink calories to represent 
a relatively  large portion of individuals’ caloric intake). 
                                                          
4
 Grogger (2017) finds that the tax was more than fully passed to consumer considering that the average 
price of a liter of soda was 11.4 pesos. His figure comes from prices used by INEGI to calculate the 
consumers’ price index. However, there is no doubt that the price increased almost 13% after the tax.  
5
 According to Cawley (2015), the average state tax on soft drinks in the US is about 4%. 
6
 See Tosun and Skidmore (2007) for an example of the effects of cross-border shopping in the US. 
3 
 
Our article studies specifically the effect of the Mexican soft drink tax on 
consumption. Therefore, this brief review of the literature focuses on the first two issues 
listed in the previous paragraph. That is, the effect of the tax on the price of the good as 
well as the effect of the price change (caused by the tax) on consumption. Nevertheless, it is 
worth mentioning that some recent studies such as Lin et al. (2011) and Fletcher et al. 
(2014) include more detailed reviews of all the relevant literature. 
There is a group of studies such as Lin et al. (2011), Zhen et al. (2011) and 
Dharmasena and Capps (2012) that evaluate the effects of a hypothetical soft drink tax on 
the consumption of this good in the US. The standard assumption in this literature is that 
there is a one-to-one transmission of the tax to consumers.
7
 With this idea in mind, the 
authors use a panel data on households’ food and drink purchases in order to estimate an 
almost-ideal-demand-system. Afterwards, they use direct and cross price elasticity 
estimates to simulate the effects of a price increase in soft drinks (presumably caused by the 
tax) on consumption. The price elasticity estimates that they find are between 0.95 and 
2.26. These numbers indicate that a 20% tax would reduce consumption of soft drinks 
between 19 and 45%. 
A few articles such as Valero (2006) and Colechero et al. (2015) estimate the price 
elasticity of demand for soft drinks in Mexico. These studies use data –gathered before the 
approval of the tax– from the households’ incomes and expenditures national survey 
(ENIGH). It is important to mention that this data base is a cross-section instead of a panel. 
Nevertheless, the results of Valero (2006) and Colchero et al. (2015) are in line with 
previous findings. Valero (2006) estimates that own price elasticity of demand for soft 
drinks in Mexico is 1.4, while Colchero et al. (2015) find it to be slightly above unity 
(between 1.06 and 1.16). These elasticities suggest that a 12.8% increase in the price of soft 
drinks –such as the one that took place in Mexico after the tax– would reduce consumption 
between 13.6 and 17.9%. 
In contrast with most of the literature, Fuentes and Zamudio (2014) find relatively 
small own price elasticity estimates of demand for soft drinks in Mexico. Their estimates 
are between 0.16 and 0.44. It is important to say that Fuentes and Zamudio (2014) use 
ENIGH as Valero (2006) and Colchero et al. (2015), as well as similar estimation methods. 
However, they estimate price elasticities for different groups of soft drink package sizes. In 
other words, they control for price discrimination practices –volume discounts– that are 
common in this industry. If their price elasticity estimates are correct, we would expect 
consumption to fall between 2 and 5.6% as a consequence of the Mexican tax on soft 
drinks. 
                                                          
7
 As explained earlier, the Mexican experience corroborates that this is the case. Moreover, Grogger (2017) 
claims that the Mexican soft drink tax was more than fully passed to consumers. 
4 
 
Interestingly, there are a few recent studies that use the Mexican soft drink tax to 
estimate its effects on consumption.
8
 For instance, Colchero et al. (2016) use a panel data of 
household purchases covering two years before the tax and one year after the tax. They 
estimate that –on average– the tax reduced per-capita consumption by 6% during the first 
year. Moreover, they argue that the effect of the tax increases with time. In particular, they 
claim that consumption falls 12% by the end of the year. More recently, Colchero et al. 
(2017) estimate smaller effects for the same tax. That is, they calculated that per-capita 
consumption of soft drinks decreased 5.5% during the first year and 9.7% during the second 
year after the tax. It is important to note that these figures are small in comparison to what 
most price elasticity estimates suggest but slightly larger than what we would expect if 
Fuentes and Zamudio (2014) elasticity estimates are correct. 
3. Data and Econometric Model 
Unlike most previous studies that use household cross-sections or panel data, we use 
monthly industry time series data (from January of 2007 to March of 2017) in order to 
estimate the effect of the Mexican soft drinks tax on consumption.
9
 An advantage of this 
approach is that industry data covers consumption both at-home and away-from-home, 
while household data only covers the former. Consumption of soft drinks away-from-home 
is relatively large in Mexico. For instance, daily per-capita soft drinks consumption 
estimates in Colchero et al. (2017) are below 0.2 liters, while industry data –as we will 
show in a moment– reveals that this figure is well above 0.35 liters.     
It is important to mention that soft drinks industry sales should match consumption 
very closely. Soft drinks are costly to transport. Therefore, imports and exports are very 
unusual in this market. Indeed, soft drink companies in Mexico and many other countries 
around the world distribute their products through a network of bottlers across the country. 
Hence, consumers by enlarge buy soft drinks that not only are bottled in the country but 
very likely in their own towns. 
The dependent variable in our study is average daily consumption of soft drinks per-
capita. We construct this variable by combining soft drinks industry sales data from 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) with population data from Consejo 
Nacional de Población (CONAPO). In particular, we use INEGI’s monthly manufacturing 
industry survey (EMIM) to obtain the amount of soft drink (in liters) sold in the country 
                                                          
8
 There are some studies in the US such as Fletcher et al. (2010) and Fletcher et al. (2013) that use actual tax 
changes to evaluate the effects of a soft drink tax.  
9
 Blundell et al. (1993) compare micro and aggregate-based demand models. They conclude that micro 
based models do not outperform aggregate-based models in terms of prediction or estimation of the price 
elasticity. 
5 
 
each month. This variable is divided by the number of days and the projected population in 
the corresponding month.
10
 
Figure 1 shows monthly averages of daily per-capita soft drinks consumption in 
Mexico during the last 10 years. Note that during most of the period, daily per-capita 
consumption of soft drinks in Mexico is well above 0.35 liters (about a 12 ounce can of 
soda). Furthermore, note that consumption exhibits large changes within the year 
depending on weather conditions. It typically increases during the summer and decreases 
during the winter. For any given year, January is the month in which consumption is the 
lowest. On the other hand, the month in which consumption is the highest may be between 
May and August depending on the year. 
Figure 1. Average daily consumption of soft drinks per capita in Mexico in liters 
 
Given that consumption exhibits large changes within the year as well as some 
changes across the years, it is extremely difficult to detect the effect of the tax –if any– by 
simply looking at the data. For instance, the highest per-capita consumption of soft drinks 
in the series took place in the summer of year 2011. Since then, summer peak consumption 
of soft drinks has been falling year after year. This reduction in consumption started several 
years before the introduction of the tax.   
Some basic statistics of the monthly averages of daily per-capita soft drinks 
consumption in years 2013 and 2014 can help us have a first approximation of the effect of 
the tax. Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of daily average per-capita 
consumption of soft drinks in Mexico during the years immediately before and after the tax. 
The difference between the two means is 0.0134 liters (about 0.46 ounces). Note that this 
quantity is about one half of the standard deviation. Note also that this change represents 
about 3% of mean consumption before the tax.  
                                                          
10
 CONAPO publishes Mexican population projections for years 1990-2010 and 2010-2030. This information 
can be obtained from the following link: http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/Proyecciones_Datos. We 
use this data and assume a constant monthly population growth rate during the year to generate a monthly 
population projection.  
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Table 1. Average of daily consumption before and after the tax 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
 Liters Ounces Liters Ounces 
2013 (Before the tax) 
2014 (After the tax) 
Difference 
0.4396 
0.4226 
-0.0134 
14.87 
14.41 
-0.46 
0.026 
0.035 
0.87 
1.17 
Sources: Elaborated with data from CONAPO and INEGI. 
 
While the simple comparison of average per-capita consumption right before and 
after the tax is a reasonable approximation of the effect of the tax, it does not take into 
account the dynamics of the time series. We can obtain a better estimate of the effect of the 
tax by regressing a soft drinks consumption equation that considers potentials trends and a 
structural break, as well as season effects.
11
 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑟+2𝐷𝑠
11
𝑟=1 + 𝛿𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 
The variables in this equation are defined as follows. The dependent variable, lnqt, is the 
natural logarithm of average per-capita consumption of soft drinks at month t. The 
independent variables include: a deterministic trendt, a dummy variable breakt,
12
 a set of 
dummy variables (one for each month) Ds,
13
 a dummy variable taxt and an error term 𝜀t. 
Note that coefficient δ captures the effect of the tax on soft drinks consumption. Finally, it 
is worth highlighting that by using the dummy variable taxt –which is clearly exogenous– 
instead of the price index of soft drinks, we can solve the latent problem of endogeneity 
between quantity and price in this market. 
4. Results 
We estimated several versions of the empirical model trying to take into account 
that the data suggests the presence of a trend, a structural break and a change in trend after 
the break. The first version includes a trend, a structural break and an interaction between 
the trend and the structural break. The interaction term attempts to capture a potential 
change in the trend after the break. The second version excludes the interaction term. The 
third version excludes the trend but includes the interaction term. The last version excludes 
the trend and the interaction term. 
                                                          
11
 Even though the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF, 1981) unit root test suggests that this variable is non 
stationary, we include this variable in levels, and not in first differences, in our equation. The reason is that 
Phillips-Perron (1988) tests suggest the variable is stationary. Additionally, and due to the presences of 
structural breaks, we also estimate Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lee and Strazicich (2003,2004) unit root 
tests under the presence of parameter instability. Both tests conclude that the per-capita consumption of 
soft drink series is stationary. 
12
 We estimate various regression models changing the date of the structural break. We set it on November 
2010 as it has the highest value of the t-statistics of the parameter associated with the structural break. 
13
 We exclude the month of December. Thus monthly dummies reflect changes in consumption with respect 
to this month. 
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Table 2 shows the main results of estimating directly the impact of a soft drink tax 
on per-capita consumption of these goods in Mexico. It is important to mention that we 
corrected these estimates for heteroscedasticity.
14
 Thus, we include heteroscedasticity and 
consistent standard errors in parenthesis. The results confirm that there was a structural 
break at the end of year 2010. Per-capita consumption increased about 8% after the break. 
Although the coefficients associated with the trend or its interaction with the structural 
break are not statistically different from zero, we report the results of the different versions 
of the empirical model. There seems to be a very small positive trend in consumption 
before the break and a similarly small but negative one afterwards. 
Table 2. Estimated impact of a tax on soft drink consumption in Mexico 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.93187*** 
(0.01317) 
-0.92865*** 
(0.01066) 
-0.92714*** 
(0.01066) 
-0.92725*** 
(0.00731) 
Trend 0.00021 
(0.00040) 
0.00006 
(0.00027) 
  
 
Break 0.09183*** 
(0.02226) 
0.08020*** 
(0.01320) 
0.08731*** 
(0.02089) 
0.08265*** 
(0.00854) 
Trend*Break -0.00028 
(0.00048) 
 -0.00007 
(0.00032) 
 
Tax -0.03558** 
(0.01622) 
-0.04051*** 
(0.01404) 
-0.03545** 
(0.01611) 
-0.03825*** 
(0.00718) 
R
2
 0.87145 0.87098 0.87096 0.87090 
R
2
 adj 0.85343 0.85425 0.85424 0.85550 
AIC -4.09841 -4.11101 -4.11090 -4.12663 
Schwarz -3.73260 -3.76806 -3.76795 -3.80655 
Observations 123 123 123 123 
 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and consistent standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. The estimated equation includes 
a set of 11 seasonal dummy variables. 
 
It is easy to observe that the inclusion of a trend affects the magnitude of the 
estimated effect of the tax on per-capita consumption of soft drinks. If we only include a 
linear trend in the regression, as in column (2), we find that the tax reduces per-capita 
consumption about 4%. However, if we include an interaction term that takes into account 
for a change in the trend, as in column (3), then we find that the effect of the tax is about 
3.5%. Finally, if we use standard criteria to select the model, then it is better to exclude 
both the trend and the interaction term as in column (4). This suggests that Colchero et al. 
(2016) conclusion about the effect of the tax on consumption increasing with time may not 
be correct. 
                                                          
14
 We borrow the procedure from Newey and West (1987).  
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Once we control for seasonal dynamics of consumption and the existence of a 
structural break in the series, it is clear that the tax imposed on soft drinks in Mexico did 
reduce consumption. More precisely, the tax reduced per-capita consumption of soft drinks 
3.8%.
15
 This figure is a bit larger than the first approximation of 3% obtained by comparing 
mean per-capita consumption right before and after the tax. However, the effect of the tax 
is about a quarter of the size suggested by price elasticity estimates obtained in previous 
studies such as Valero (2006) or Colchero et al. (2015), and about two thirds the size of 
direct estimates of the effect of the tax in Colchero et al. (2016) and Colchero et al. (2017). 
Interestingly, this estimate is in line with price elasticity estimates obtained by Fuentes and 
Zamudio (2014). 
5. Conclusions 
We estimate the effect of the relatively large excise tax imposed by the Mexican 
government on the consumption of soft drinks. Unlike most previous studies in the 
literature, we use a time series approach and industry data. We conclude that the tax caused 
a price increase of 12.8% and reduced per-capita consumption about 3.8%. This effect is 
fairly small in comparison to the effects that are suggested by most studies that estimate 
price elasticities using an almost-ideal-demand-system and household survey data. A 
notable exception is Fuentes and Zamudio (2014). They find similar results by controlling 
for package-size price discrimination. 
We tested several econometric models to control for trends and a structural break in 
the soft drinks consumption time series. The effect of the tax on per-capita consumption is 
sensible to the inclusion of trends in the regressions. Standard criteria suggest including a 
structural break but not the trends. In light of these results, it is hard to argue that the effect 
of the tax increases with time as suggested by previous studies. 
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